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ABSTRACT
The foundational assumption of constitutional governance
poses a conundrum for contemporary state-builders: a constitution
heavily influenced by foreigners does not represent the views of the
governed. Can a modern state-building effort foster democratic
institutions when the new government reflects foreign? Nowhere
was this tension more apparent than in Afghanistan, where the
United States and the United Nations were heavily involved in
drafting the 2004 Constitution. They shaped the process from the
initial framework to the final, frenzied approval. Foreigners were
engaged at both the procedural level—determining how the
negotiations would occur and who would participate—and at the
substantive level—providing input about particular provisions.
Using judicial review as a lens through which to understand the
constitution-writing process, this article shows how foreign
involvement led to a final draft that failed to resolve a fundamental
issue of governance: what institution had the authority to interpret
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the constitution. The resulting confusion contributed to an
ineffective central government and, eventually, the quick downfall
of the Afghan government.
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INTRODUCTION
When Americans tuned into their nightly news programs in
January 2004, they were treated to images of hundreds of Afghans
coming together in a large tent, debating a new proposed
constitution.1 Evoking the collective memory of the constitutional
convention of 1787, this gathering of men—and a small number of
women—presented a benign, even beneficial, image of U.S.
occupation, one that empowered Afghans to use law and legal
reform to build a better society while international officials stood
back. These images of hope from 2004 stand in stark contrast with
those from August 2021, showing a disorganized and tragic
evacuation as the United States ceded control of the country back to
the Taliban.2 Tens of thousands of Afghans desperately tried to flee
the country, fearing retaliation for their work with the United States
and U.S.-backed Afghan government.
These two seemingly discordant events are not as disconnected
as we might initially think. The pomp and circumstance of the
Afghan constitution-drafting gathering, more properly called the
Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), masked the true level of U.S.
involvement in the constitutional process. Positioned to the side of
the main tent, largely out of view of the cameras, foreign officials
and their Afghan allies called most of the shots. 3 For months
beforehand, a small group of foreign officials and their chosen
partners had pushed a constitutional vision with a strong central
state headed by a powerful executive, with few external checks on

ABC Evening News (ABC television broadcast Jan. 4, 2004).
See Video Shows Afghans Clinging to Outside of US Military Plane as It Takes Off,
CNN (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/08/16/kabulclinging-to-airplane-taking-off-tarmac-afghanistan-ward-vpx.cnn
[https://perma.cc/TXX7-23TP].
3 See J. Alexander Thier, Big Tent, Small Tent: The Making of a Constitution in
Afghanistan, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTION MAKING
535,
550
(Laurel
E.
Miller
ed.,
2010),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20the%20State/Chapter20_
Framing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SU2-YKDB] (discussing the substantial
involvement of U.S. and U.N. envoys); see also Miriam Ghani, Annotated Guide to the
Interactive
Map,
KABUL
RECONSTRUCTIONS,
http://www.kabulreconstructions.net/constitutions/GuideToTheMap.pdf [https://perma.cc/J94EMU4K] (listing the U.N. and U.S. officials who assisted in the CLJ proceedings
taking place in the VIP tents).
1
2
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power. Once enshrined in the Constitution, this vision laid the
groundwork for years of disfunction and corruption.4
More than fifteen years later, the formal Afghan government
seemed to evaporate overnight, with high-level officials fleeing the
country and other institutions shutting down.5 Though many of the
failures and miscalculations leading up to that moment were
political and military decisions, legal missteps contributed to the
quick downfall.6 Afghanistan’s Constitution of 2004 did not create
robust and effective methods to resolve disputes—even those that
fell within the limited purview of the country’s formal legal
mechanisms. The lack of effective, functional government
institutions made it easier for the Taliban to win control of the
country, though U.S. officials were quick to blame Afghans. During
and after the U.S. withdrawal, President Biden invoked the common
but inaccurate trope 7 of Afghanistan as a “graveyard of empires”
that “is not susceptible to unity,” conveniently absolving the United
States of responsibility.8
But in fact, the system of governance established in 2004 proved
to be unworkable. Constitutions occupy a unique space in the legal
and moral identity of a country, but above all they establish the
parameters of how disputes over governance should be resolved—
4
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, The Collapse of Afghanistan, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan.
2022, at 40, 42-45 (discussing the absence of democratic provisions in Afghanistan’s
constitution).
5 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Fahim Abed & Sharif Hassan, The Afghan Military
Was Built Over 20 Years. How Did It Collapse so Quickly?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/world/asia/afghanistan-rapid-militarycollapse.html [https://perma.cc/2YF9-96WJ]; see also Murtazashvili, supra note 4,
at 42 (“[H]ad the Afghan state not been considered illegitimate by the people, the
Taliban would not have had a fighting chance inside of Afghanistan.”).
6 Cf. Shamshad Pasarlay, Fatal Non-Evolution: Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution
and the Collapse of Political Order, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://verfassungsblog.de/fatal-non-evolution/ [https://perma.cc/UAY2-8L4J]
(arguing that Afghanistan’s constitutional breakdown stems not from the
concentration of centralized power in the constitution itself, but from the failure of
subsequent Afghan governments to adapt).
7 See Alexander Hainy-Khaleeli, Why We Need to Stop Calling Afghanistan “The
Graveyard of Empires”, AJAM MEDIA COLLECTIVE (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://ajammc.com/2021/08/24/stop-calling-afghanistan-graveyard-empires/
[https://perma.cc/CR8G-E6T9] (“Far from being a place where empires go to die,
the land of Afghanistan was, for millennia, a place in which they thrived and
prospered, thanks in part to its strategic location at the crossroads of Asia.”).
8
President Joseph R. Biden, Remarks in Press Conference (Jan. 19, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2022/01/19/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-6/
[https://perma.cc/DKW5-XX27] .
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both national values and the institutions that should implement
them.9 Afghanistan’s constitution may have been doomed from the
start because the Taliban was excluded from the drafting process
and unlikely to participate in whatever power-sharing arrangement
emerged, 10 but there were other flaws—foreign leadership, poor
public consultation, weak institutional design, and a penchant for
symbolism over substance. These flaws were at the very heart of U.S.
state-building, which assumed American-style democracy could be
exported through largely symbolic gestures towards participatory
governance.
The United States and the United Nations were heavily involved
in drafting the 2004 Constitution. They shaped the process from the
initial framework to the final, frenzied approval. Foreigners were
engaged at both the procedural level—determining how the
negotiations would occur and who would participate—and at the
substantive level—providing input about particular provisions. The
United States enforced specific policy preferences on some hotbutton issues like the role of religion and the status of women. On
many other issues, however, the United States agreed to “stand
aside” while Afghans worked through the drafting process.11 This
reflected the growing conventional wisdom that intervening in
process was good practice, while intervening in substance was
disfavored.12 U.S. and U.N. officials nevertheless exerted control by
9 See Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and
Political Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 3, 8 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) (examining
constitutions as expressions of values and manifestations of power).
10
See JOHNNY WALSH, U.S. INST. PEACE, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER A
PEACE
AGREEMENT
1
(2020),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan-PeaceProcess_Constitutional-Review-Under-a-Peace-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS3C-Q8P7] (noting that “the Taliban object at least as much to
their exclusion from the 2004 process as to any particular provision of the document
it produced”).
11
ZALMAY KHALILZAD, THE ENVOY: FROM KABUL TO THE WHITE HOUSE, MY
JOURNEY THROUGH A TURBULENT WORLD 194 (2016).
12 See Laurel E. Miller, Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the
Past, Questions for the Future, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 601, 642 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (“In general,
rather than demanding a particular end product or strengthening a particular party,
the role of the United Nations or foreign powers is best focused on ensuring a good
process—one that is broadly inclusive and has sufficient resources and staffing,
adequate time, and neutral outside expert assistance.”); cf. VIVIEN HART, U.S. INST.
PEACE, SPECIAL REP. 107, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING 1 (2003) (“Process has
become equally as important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy
of a new constitution.”).
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setting a quick timeline and giving little weight to public opinion.
These procedural controls, as well as substantive interventions,
meant that the United States and the United Nations influenced all
aspects of the Constitution.
Using judicial review13 as a lens through which to understand
the constitution-writing process, this Article shows how U.S.
involvement shaped the final result even in substantive areas where
foreigners did not dictate a specific outcome. The United States did
not take a firm line on the specifics of judicial review, but it
promoted a system with a strong executive with few checks on
authority. 14 Judicial review and constitutional interpretation were
important to influential Afghans who saw their potential to
constrain a powerful president with U.S. backing or, in some cases,
as a way to increase the influence of religion in governance. Since
the foreigners did not insist on a particular result, 15 the final
outcome could be vague. In the end, the Constitution did not
definitively specify which institution had the authority to interpret
the Constitution, or how judicial review of different types of
government action should occur. Both the Supreme Court and a
separate entity called the Independent Commission for Overseeing
the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC) claimed
constitutional authority to interpret the document and review

13
This technical detail of governmental structure has been commonplace in
new constitutions since the middle of the 20th century. Most modern constitutions
invoke judicial review to constrain the executive and legislative branches of
government. Judicial review is considered an important element of democracy and
constitutional development. See Tom Ginsburg, The Rise of Constitutional Courts and
Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 290, 292 (David S. Clark, ed., 2012)
(discussing the use of judicial review in Latin American and Mexican constitutions
as an important mechanism for the protection of individual rights); MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, AFG. RSCH. & EVALUATION UNIT, AFGHANISTAN’S CONSTITUTION
TEN YEARS ON: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 4 (2014) (noting that modern constitutions
provide judicial review as a means to limit the powers of the executive and
legislative branches); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 9 (2003) (documenting the late-twentieth
century shift towards establishing special courts tasked with constitutional review).
See generally CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, MARK ELLIOTT, SWATI JHAVERI, MICHAEL
RAMSDEN & ANNE SCULLY-HILL, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF
GOOD GOVERNANCE (2010) (reviewing the scope and transformation of judicial
review in common law countries and analyzing common problems across
jurisdictions).
14
Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Iraq, and Afghanistan, U.S. Dept. State, in Washington D.C. (June 1, 2015).
15 Id.
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various government acts and laws for constitutional compliance.16
The ambiguity caused a “crisis” in constitutional interpretation. 17
The confusing text of the final Constitution was the outcome of a
last-minute debate between different Afghan factions, but it was
also the product of a long process that prioritized the needs of the
United States and its allies while marginalizing dissenting views. As
a result, the Constitution failed to resolve a fundamental issue of
governance and ultimately contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
central government.
Drawing on interviews with several of the major American
actors, as well as archival material, this article details the origins of
the dispute over constitutional interpretation and how its
persistence contributed to constitutional collapse. Part I situates the
Afghan Constitution within a tradition of U.S. imposed
constitutions. Part II traces the dispute over judicial review through
the drafting process, showing the role of Americans and their
Afghan allies in creating institutional conflict. Part III details how
Afghan presidents and parliament exploited the textual ambiguity
to advance their own constitutional interpretations, leading to years
of confusion. Part IV shows the damage the conflict inflicted on
Afghanistan’s prospects for peaceful, constitutional governance.
Part V discusses the contradictory legacies of constitutional
ambiguity on the rule of law. The Conclusion suggests that
foreigners cannot intervene in the process of constitution drafting
without also influencing the substance and that foreign interference
in the Afghanistan constitutional process ultimately contributed to
instability.
I. IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONS
The weakness of the Afghan Constitution stemmed from specific
policy choices, such as the decision to bypass local actors in favor of

16
The body is sometimes referred to as the Independent Commission for the
Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC). The organization uses ICOIC in its
English materials. I follow its usage.
17 See J. ALEXANDER THIER & JOHN DEMPSEY, U.S. INST. PEACE, RESOLVING THE
CRISIS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2009),
https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/03/resolving-crisis-overconstitutional-interpretation-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/XPT7-CFA5].
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centralized institutions, 18 but it was also rooted in the imposed
nature of the Constitution itself. When foreigners substantially
influence a constitution, it cannot plausibly reflect a democratic
arrangement between the government and the governed. The
question facing outside forces is whether such an undemocratic
drafting process can foster an enduring, representative governing
arrangement.
a. Role of Constitutions and Constitution-Writing
Nearly all countries in the contemporary world operate under
the legal umbrella of a constitution.19 Constitutions express national
values, reflect power dynamics, serve as coordinating devices, and
function as contracts. 20 They may protect minorities, including
groups who are out of power, to reduce the likelihood of extraconstitutional (often violent) means of political participation. 21 In
countries emerging from upheaval, new constitutions can unite
disputing parties under a governing rubric while giving voice to the
values of the new regime. 22 Constitution-making in post-conflict
contexts can be a form of reconciliation and transitional justice. 23
Constitution writing can also be a performative act for both
domestic and foreign audiences. It can signal that the new
18 See Murtazashvili, supra note 4, at 47 (“A final assumption common among
both the international community and many Afghan authorities was that
Afghanistan’s traditional decentralized political order, rich in customary
governance and tradition, was anathema to the normative underpinnings of a
modern state, such as gender equality and formal democracy.”).
19 See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 48-50, 49 n.11 (2009).
20
Galligan & Versteeg, supra note 9, at 8.
21
ELKINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 38.
22
Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1535 (2008) (identifying more than 200 new
constitutions which have been written “in countries at risk of internal violence” in
the preceding 40 years). But see Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton,
Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul . . . .Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1139, 1154 (2008) (noting that “a majority of occupations do not result in new
constitutions”).
23
See Aeyal Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice:
Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 49 (2004) (examining the
role constitutions play in transitional, transformation and reconciliation periods);
Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L.
663, 664 (2006) (discussing the constitution-making process in areas of postconflict).
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government will be bound by certain principles and institutional
arrangements regardless of shifting policy preferences of the
legislature or executive. It suggests a commitment to predictability
and the rule of law.
There are also risks inherent in constitution drafting, particularly
in a divided society like Afghanistan.24 These risks are heightened
when an outside power directs the constitution-making process
behind the scenes. A foreign-driven process can expose a lack of
domestic legitimacy, and the expectation that foreign support will
eventually be withdrawn may discourage local buy-in. The
reduction or end of foreign support may also encourage participants
to agree in the short term to terms that they expect to challenge in
the long term.
In Afghanistan, foreign actors were aware of the risks. As a
result, they tried a mix of approaches, inviting domestic
participation when it was feasible and convenient, limiting it when
Afghan voices interfered too strongly with foreign interests. U.S.
and U.N. officials had to be responsive to their own domestic and
internal audiences, particularly in the United States where the rights
of Afghan women became a justification for the invasion and
occupation.25 Certain substantive areas, like a formal guarantee of
gender equality, were nonnegotiable. But in many other areas, the
United States kept its influence in the shadows. Nevertheless, U.S.
influence was pervasive. The demand for an agreement at any cost
pushed the drafters towards ambiguous compromises with limited
efficacy.
b. Definitions
Drafting a new constitution is fundamentally a domestic
political engagement, but the process is increasingly globalized. 26
New constitutions are influenced by a host of international and
foreign factors, as well as direct foreign intervention. The amplified
role of the United Nations, foreign governments, technical advisors,
24

(2011).

HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS

IN

DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 33

25
Kim Berry, The Symbolic Use of Afghan Women in the War on Terror, 27
HUMBOLDT J. SOC. RELS. 137, 137 (2003).
26
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1171 (2011).
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and NGOs has contributed to what one scholar referred to as the
“constitutional law industrial complex.” 27 The “complex” is
particularly active when the constitution is drafted under the
auspices of a foreign or international military presence. These
“occupation constitutions” are common. 28 Since 1789, at least 42
constitutions have been written during or just after periods of
foreign occupation.29
Occupation constitutions cover a range of circumstances, from
end-stage colonial transition arrangements to carefully monitored
UN-brokered peace agreements. Imposed constitutions are a subset
of these documents. Not all foreign involvement in constitution
drafting means that a constitution is imposed. Various
constituencies may invite foreigners to provide advice or expertise
in technical matters, or to share their own experiences in domestic
constitution-writing. Scholars have developed several methods to
classify foreign involvement in constitution drafting, often drawing
the line of what constitutes an “imposed” constitution in different
places.30 The Afghan case suggests a broad definition is appropriate:
a constitution is imposed if foreigners use military, economic,
diplomatic or financial power to obtain substantive or procedural
results that advance their interests. This definition avoids creating a
strict dichotomy between constitutions written by foreigners and
those in which foreigners ‘merely’ exploited a power imbalance in
27
Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 885 (2005);
see also Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1473 (2008) (criticizing outside normative advice during
constitutional drafting).
28
Elkins et al., supra note 22, at 1140.
29 Id. at 1152. Due to definitional choices that exclude colonial occupations and
certain territories, this should be considered a minimum estimate.
30
Manon Bonnet, The Legitimacy of Internationally Imposed Constitution-Making
in the Context of State Building, in THE LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF IMPOSED
CONSTITUTIONS 208, 209 (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou
eds., 2019) (discussing the dimensions and repercussions of a constitution-drafting
process initiated by foreigners and discussing how those repercussions obtain
regardless of the precise nature of further involvement by foreigners in a nation’s
constitution drafting); Philipp Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir
Constituant—Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East
Timor, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 423, 428-30 (2006) (proposing three categories of
the degree of external influence: total, partial, and marginal); Frederick Schauer, On
the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907, 907 (2005) (reserving the
classification of “imposed” for constitutions with truly minimal domestic input);
Feldman, supra note 27, at 858-59 (defining a contemporary imposed constitution as
one in which there is “substantial local participation in the constitutional process;
but . . . also seen substantial intervention and pressure imposed from outside to
produce constitutional outcomes preferred by international actors”).
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their favor. It also implicates constitutions where foreigners
influence the process of drafting, which can have significant
substantive ramifications. Imposed constitutions have always
involved varying degrees of local participation. 31 A constitution
need not be entirely written by outsiders to be imposed.
There have been many historical imposed constitutions, but
there are unique features to constitutions crafted “in the shadow of
the gun” 32 in the twenty-first century. Constitution drafters have
months to prepare, access to national and international experts, and
the ability to communicate with the public through modern
technology. International NGOs and experts are plentiful and wellresourced, while local populations and community groups may not
be. Technology facilitates rapid communication around the globe.
And, most importantly, it is not politically acceptable or desirable
for outsiders to simply write a constitution for another country. 33
Such a process would be obviously undemocratic and run counter
to the publicly expressed values of the United States, United
Nations, and European countries. Contemporary constitution
drafters must grapple with how to appear to create democratic
institutions without undermining domestic legitimacy or
compromising their own national interest in particular outcomes.
c. Inherent Contradictions
Constitution-drafting presents a paradox for occupying forces
seeking to empower new local governments after a military conflict;
there is no credible pretense that a constitution heavily influenced
by foreigners represents the views of the governed. 34 Imposed
31
Elkins et al., supra note 22, at 1163 (arguing that the 1946 Japanese
constitution reflected more Japanese involvement than previously realized); see also
Richard Albert, Constitutions Imposed with Consent?, in THE LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF
IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONS 103 (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene
Fotiadou eds., 2019) (analyzing the scholarly debate surrounding imposed
constitutions).
32
Feldman, supra note 27, at 858.
33 Id. at 879 (“The crucial fact about the dynamics of contemporary imposed
constitutionalism is that the constitutional drafting process is understood by all
participants as a negotiation among local political elites and the occupying power
and international organizations capable of exerting pressure.”); see also HART, supra
note 12, at 12 (“Despite efforts at external intervention, a democratic constitution
cannot be written for a nation.”).
34
This is not unique to constitutions imposed by foreigners. Constitutions
may embody values that are unrepresentative in a myriad of ways. The U.S.
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constitutions always infringe on sovereignty and selfdetermination,35 but they raise unique problems when the outside
power is ostensibly attempting to foster representative governance
while at the same time protecting its interests and providing legal
safeguards for specific communities. Foreign intervention creates a
fundamental disjunction between the constitution and popular
will.36 If outsiders intervene in the substance, they risk creating a
document that does not reflect the preferences of the governed. If
they intervene in the process, they risk a situation where the
recipient nation does not have the institutional capacity or will to
enforce the new constitution.
Process and procedure are increasingly recognized as important
components of constitutionalism.37 They are also seen as a proper
venue for foreigners to exert influence.38 Even when an occupying
force has no public hard line on a specific issue, it may still shape the
process and power distribution in a way that privileges particular
outcomes. In these instances, the occupier may empower a
particular local actor or structure the drafting process in a way that
favors one group over another. Short timelines, for instance, permit
less public participation and encourage political actors to make
choices that maximize their immediate political gain.39 This can have
important implications for the legitimacy and democratic nature of
the resulting constitution.
In the iconic imposed constitutions of the twentieth century—
post-World War II West Germany and Japan—Allied diplomats and
military officers went to great lengths to limit the perception of their
involvement. 40 After the war, the United States and its allies
Constitution did not protect the rights of women or enslaved people, and even
many modern constitutions which are facially more inclusive represent the will of
the elite or an autocratic state. Many constitution-writing processes are highly
circumscribed and hardly democratic. See generally Miller, supra note 12, at 629-38
(introducing case studies in different countries incorporating public participation
in the constitution-making process).
35
Bonnet, supra note 30, at 213.
36
Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 30, at 427.
37
Louis Aucoin, Introduction to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION:
CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 3, at xiii; Widner, supra note 22,
at 1514; HART, supra note 12.
38
Miller, supra note 12, at 642.
39
Bonnet, supra note 30, at 218-19.
40
EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM: AMERICAN
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON THE FRAMING OF THE WEST GERMAN BASIC
LAW (GRUNDGESETZ) 124 (2001); JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 386-92 (1999).
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pursued two distinct approaches to circumvent the problematique of
a ‘democratic’ constitution written by occupying forces. In Japan,
U.S. forces did not initially plan to write the new constitution
directly, but General MacArthur did not hesitate to empower a small
group of U.S. officials with the task when the Japanese government
failed to move quickly enough to implement the reforms he thought
necessary. 41 The Japanese were able to work around some U.S.
designs through translation, 42 but American influence was
significant. 43 The extent of U.S. involvement was an ‘open secret’
among a select few, but the public did not become aware until
several years after the war. 44 Despite an outcry and periodic
discussions about amendments, it remains unaltered. The situation
in Germany was quite different. The Allies were not so bold as to
write the German Basic Law outright. Instead, they established
guidelines for “where the process of constitution-making in
Germany should head” and intervened when the Germans deviated
from these parameters.45 The Allies largely controlled the drafting
procedures and exerted both informal and formal control over the
substance. 46 The end product was a compromise with significant
U.S. influence.47
As in Afghanistan nearly sixty years later, these constitutiondrafting exercises were part of a larger strategy to liberalize the
Japanese and German legal systems. After failing to curb German
militarism after World War I, U.S. occupiers in the late 1940s took a
holistic approach towards inculcating liberal values of individual
rights through reforming not only constitutions but also courts,
laws, and the judiciary. These efforts resulted in “substantial but, at
the end of the day, incomplete transformational change.” 48
Nevertheless, Germany and Japan loomed large in the imagination

41
General MacArthur’s influence was so pervasive that the document is
commonly referred to as “MacArthur’s constitution.”
42
KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND
CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 2 (1991).
43 See DOWER, supra note 40, at 346-404.
44 Id. at 385.
45
SPEVACK, supra note 40, at 121.
46 Id. at 173-79.
47 Id. at 22.
48
R.W. KOSTAL, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: THE AMERICAN LEGAL REVOLUTIONS IN
OCCUPIED GERMANY AND JAPAN 7-8 (2019).
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of twenty-first century nation-builders. 49 They held out the
tantalizing possibility of a peaceful, representative government
emerging from a U.S. military occupation. President George W.
Bush even referred to the post-war experience of Europe and Japan
as “a beacon to light the path that we too must follow.”50 But these
“beacons” pointed in different directions when it came to U.S.
involvement in constitution writing. Public opinion and heightened
media attention would not have allowed for a repeat of the situation
in Japan. Instead, the approach in Afghanistan mostly closely
echoed that in Germany.
II. DRAFTING THE AFGHAN CONSTITUTION
Like their post-war predecessors, twenty-first century occupiers
had to contend with the contradiction of fostering a representative
government using unrepresentative means. U.S. diplomats and
advisors faced great uncertainty regarding short-term and longterm prospects for the successful creation of a stable governing
structure. They also had to navigate American politics, particularly
related to women’s rights and religious freedom. Most significantly,
they had to devise a new government that would work with U.S.
counter-terrorism efforts and support controversial U.S. policies
regarding detainees and military operations. This required a high
degree of centralization which also dovetailed with U.S. beliefs that
a centralized state would lead to more effective internal
governance.51
In certain areas, the United States articulated clear policy
preferences or requirements, while other efforts to shape the new
constitution were less overt. U.S. influence was both direct and
indirect, impacting both substance and process. Though the
constitutional drafting period lasted two years and benefitted from
49 See generally NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ 1 (2004) (describing the
influence of German and Japanese rehabilitation on nation-building in Iraq).
50
President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Virginia Military Institute (Apr.
17, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_041702.html [https://perma.cc/SG5F-QX58]).
51
Murtazashvili, supra note 4, at 45 (“Although the United States promised
that decisions about the constitution would be left up to Afghans, it signaled its
preference for a centralized presidency. When pressed about the need for a weaker
executive, such as a prime minister, or greater decentralization of authority, U.S.
ambassador Robert Finn said that ‘Afghanistan needed a strong president given all
the vectors of power.’”).
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extensive Afghan and foreign technical expertise, the process was
rushed at every stage.52 Public consultations were widespread but
impact was minimal. Expert input was often subservient to the
wishes of foreign diplomats and President Karzai and his advisors.
As a result, both expert recommendations and public support for
more decentralized governing arrangements, such as a strong
parliament, were overruled. Calls for a robust constitutional court
with strong powers of judicial review were sidelined, eliminating a
potential check on presidential power. The high degree of
centralization, strong presidential powers, and low level of
accountability weakened the subsequent Afghan government.53
a. The Bonn Agreement
The Constitution was drafted and adopted under the auspices of
the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government
Institutions, more commonly known as the Bonn Agreement. After
the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, the United Nations hosted a
conference in Bonn, Germany where Afghan delegates agreed on a
framework for an interim system of governance and laid the
groundwork for a more permanent arrangement. The Bonn
Agreement established interim bodies which were to govern until
an Emergency Loya Jirga could empower a Transitional Authority.
The Transitional Authority would then replace the Interim
Authority and “lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully
representative government can be elected through free and fair
elections to be held no later than two years from the date of the
convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.”54 Within two months, the
Transitional Authority was to establish a Constitutional
52
It is difficult to specify an ideal timeframe for writing a new constitution,
but we might look to the South African constitution, widely regarded as a model,
as an example. South Africans took two and half years to write an interim
constitution, which lasted for two years while a final constitution was drafted. The
final constitution did not come into force until 1996, six years after the initial
conversations about a new constitution. The entire process in Afghanistan took half
this time.
53 See Murtazashvili, supra note 4, at 45.
54
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, in letter dated Dec. 5, 2001
from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, § I(4), U.N. Doc.
S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Bonn Agreement].
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Commission to assist a Constitutional Loya Jirga in preparing a new
constitution. A jirga is a method of dispute resolution where leaders
meet to reach decisions by consensus. They are most common
among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan.55 Though jirgas
have deep roots in Pashtun tradition, 56 convening a loya jirga to
approve a new constitution or endorse a national leader is a
particularly modern phenomenon which first occurred in
Afghanistan in 1923. 57 Since then, Afghan governments have
endorsed numerous constitutions, few of which had any real
impact. 58 The Bonn Agreement endorsed Afghanistan’s 1964
Constitution, with some exceptions, as the legal framework during
the rule of the Interim Authority.59 Afghanistan’s 1964 Constitution
is considered the most liberal of the many constitutions adopted
during the 20th century. Embracing the 1964 Constitution was seen
as “a source of much-needed continuity,” but the document was still
fairly authoritarian and established a baseline of a heavily
centralized system.60
The Bonn Agreement was silent on representation, public
consultation, and the role of foreign advisors. It focused primarily
on timing and process while setting a precedent for rushed decisionmaking. The Agreement itself was passed just nine days after the
conference began.61 Four Afghan constituencies were represented: a
group with loose ties to the exiled king, two groups representing
expatriates with ties to Pakistan and Iran, and the Northern
Alliance—a military alliance of several groups opposing the Taliban
who had allied with the United States in 2001. 62 Despite long55 See THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
23-33 (2001) (giving an overview of the different ethnic and tribal groups within
Afghanistan).
56
MOHAMED KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 4 (1985).
57 Benjamin Buchholz, The Nation’s Voice? Afghanistan’s Loya Jirgas in the
Historical
Context,
AFG.
ANALYSTS
NETWORK
(Nov.
19,
2013),
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/context-culture/the-nationsvoice-afghanistans-loya-jirgas-in-the-historical-context/ [https://perma.cc/2D6P3EH8].
58 See generally id. (discussing the shortcomings of past constitutions endorsed
by Afghan governments); BARFIELD, supra note 55 (offering further discussions on
the shortcomings of past constitutions endorsed by Afghan governments).
59
Bonn Agreement, supra note 54, § II(1)(i).
60
Murtazashvili, supra note 4, at 43.
61
Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, J. DEMOCRACY, July
2004, at 5, 6.
62 Id. at 6-7.
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standing, fundamental disagreements among the participants, 63
they were able to quickly agree on the transitional process. They
reached an impasse, however, over who should lead the interim
authority and what would be appropriate role for the former king.
Karzai, who addressed the group remotely from “a small, damp hut
with mud-baked walls” in southern Afghanistan, was the
forerunner to lead the process going into the conference but faced
unexpected opposition.64 At first, the American delegates at Bonn
took an approach of “benign neglect,” but they intervened once
Karzai’s position was threatened. 65 With the support of the
Northern Alliance, Zalmay Khalilzad, an American diplomat who
spent his childhood in Afghanistan, pressured the king and his
supporters to back Karzai.66 With Karzai’s position secured, and the
contentious issue of interim cabinet positions resolved, the
conference disbanded.67
Each subsequent stage of the process was intended to be more
representative, but the final product was deemed more important
than a more open process. Lakhdar Brahimi, Head of the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “stressed
that no one would remember how unrepresentative the meeting had
been if the participants managed to fashion a process that would
lead to a legitimate and representative government.” 68 Coupled
with the unrepresentative, elite nature of the group was the lack of
public consultation or education. This may have been inevitable, as
widespread consultations take time and resources, but it became a
recurring theme. Concerns about secrecy, as well as haste and
representation, resurfaced later in the drafting process.
b. The Constitutional Drafting Commission
The Bonn Agreement gave only the barest guidance for how the
new constitution was to be drafted. A subsequent plan set down in
63
Shamshad Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan: A
History and Analysis Through the Lens of Coordination and Deferral Theory 160
(2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with the University of
Washington Library).
64
KHALILZAD, supra note 11, at 122.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 123-24.
67 Id. at 127.
68
Rubin, supra note 61, at 7.
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a U.N. working paper clarified that there would be two
commissions—a small, technical drafting commission that would
produce the first version and a larger group that would review it.69
Karzai selected the nine members of the initial Constitutional
Drafting Commission from a list prepared by the U.N. 70 On
November 7, three months late according to the timeline established
at Bonn, the former king inaugurated the Commission. 71 The
Drafting Commission struggled from the beginning to work
cohesively.72 One member of the Commission resigned because its
leader, Nematullah Shahrani, had expertise in Islamic law and not
constitutional law. 73 The remaining members produced two
competing sets of notes which differed over the proper structure of
government, appropriate constitutional rights, and form of judicial
review.74 Guy Carcassonne, a French advisor to Karzai who had also
advised the Afghan constitutional process in 1964, 75 produced a
separate draft.76 In addition to struggling with internal divisions, the
Drafting Commission had so little logistical or financial support that
it lacked a functional conference room three months after its
inauguration.77
69
Int’l Crisis Grp., Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process, ICG Asia Report
N°56, at 13 (June 12, 2003).
70
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 174-75.
71
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 69, at 13.
72
Thier, supra note 3, at 543.
73
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 178. Shahrani holds degrees from Kabul
University and Al Azhar University in Cairo. He also studied at George
Washington University. Id.
74 Id. at 181.
75
AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAILURE
OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 212 (2008).
76
In his November 2002 draft, Carcassonne recommended creating a robust
constitutional court. His initial draft gave the President, Prime Minister, and
Parliament the ability to refer treaties and international conventions, as well as
statutes that had not yet been enacted, to the court for review. Individual citizens
could also ask for review of laws as applied, subject to some limitations. Provisions
found to be unconstitutional could not be enacted or enforced, and court rulings
were final. The court also had a number of other responsibilities, including
supervising presidential elections and referendums. Carcassonne prepared other
drafts in the coming months. Notably, in a draft dated April 2003, the powers of the
constitutional court were weakened significantly. Though he provided advice,
Carcassonne’s language regarding a constitutional court was not incorporated into
drafts prepared by either the Constitutional Drafting Commission or the
Constitutional Review Commission. Drafts are on file with the author.
77
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONST. COMM’N OF AFG., THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING
PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN 10 (2003).
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In April, the Drafting Commission submitted a draft to Karzai
that was largely based on the 1964 Constitution, though it differed
on judicial review. 78 The earlier constitution had not clearly
empowered one person or institution to interpret the constitution.79
In contrast, the first draft of the 2004 Constitution included an entire
chapter creating a court with the authority to interpret the
Constitution and determine if laws conform to it.80 The draft clearly
enumerated the court’s responsibilities. These included
“examin[ing] the conformity of laws, legislative decrees, and
international treaties with the Constitution” and “interpret[ing] the
Constitution, laws and legislative decrees.” 81 Lower courts could
refer cases to the constitutional court on their own initiative or at the
request of one of the parties, and both the president and the
government could refer legislation for review.82 A decision from the
court was “final.” 83 The clarity exhibited here stands in stark
contrast to the text in the final constitution. The Drafting
Commission, which struggled to work productively, managed to
agree that a body independent of the Supreme Court should have
authority to interpret the constitution. Members of the Drafting
Commission embraced a constitutional court because of its ability to

78
See Shoaib Timory, Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation in
Afghanistan: A Case of Inconsistency, 42 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 223, 227-34
(2019) (giving a history of judicial review in Afghan law from the 1880s to 2004).
For a broader discussion of Afghan history, see BARFIELD, supra note 55; ELISABETH
LEAKE, THE DEFIANT BORDER: THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDERLANDS IN THE ERA OF
DECOLONIZATION, 1936-1965 (2016); TIMOTHY NUNAN, HUMANITARIAN INVASION:
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLD WAR AFGHANISTAN (2016); BARNETT R. RUBIN,
AFGHANISTAN FROM THE COLD WAR THROUGH THE WAR ON TERROR (2013).
79
THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Oct. 1, 1964, arts. 7, 94, 102; see also
Mohammad Qasim Hashimzai, The Separation of Powers and the Problem of
Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 665, 675 (Rainer Grote & Tilmann
Röder eds., 2012).
80
There is no official English translation of the draft constitutions, though
drafts were translated into English at various times during the process. Pasarlay
provides an English translation of the portions of the final CDC draft related to the
constitutional court, as well as all draft articles for which the wording in the final
constitution differed from that put forth by the Constitutional Drafting
Commission. Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 195, app. B.
81 Id. at 195.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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constrain executive power and because of the growing prevalence
internationally of such courts.84
c. The Constitutional Review Commission and Public Consultations
In April 2003, Karzai appointed members of a Constitutional
Review Commission (CRC) in consultation with a small group of
powerful government ministers who were affiliated with the
Northern Alliance and who had been central to the foreign coalition
military strategy. 85 The Review Commission included militia
leaders, Islamists, liberals, and allies of Karzai, as well as
representatives of different ethnic groups. This disparate group
tried to establish some independence from Karzai by not initially
sharing its work with him.86
The Review Commission marked the first time when the public
had a voice in the new constitution. Commission members held
meetings throughout the provinces and gathered feedback through
questionnaires in newspapers. There was also an educational
campaign using TV, print, and radio.87 Members of the public seized
the opportunity to be heard. Despite the challenges of soliciting
opinions on highly technical aspects of government from a
dispersed and impoverished population, the Review Commission
received 80,000 completed questionnaires, 6,000 written proposals
and 17,000 oral suggestions. 88 Though public consultation was
extensive, it had little impact.89 The final report was issued too late
to benefit the Review Commission, though individual members
were involved in collecting the information it contained. Even after
the report was published in October, it was not distributed to

84
Shamshad Pasarlay, Restraining Judicial Power: The Fragmented System of
Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 245, 253 (2018).
85
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 69, at 16.
86
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 200.
87
Thier, supra note 3, at 546.
88
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONST. REV. COMM’N, ANALYTICAL REPORT OF PEOPLE’S
VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DRAFTING OF A NEW CONSTITUTION 9 (2003).
89
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 207 n.123. This “participation without power” is
not limited to Afghanistan. See Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in
Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1045
(2008).
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members of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in advance.90 Participants
only received the report upon arriving at the Jirga itself.
Had the drafters had the benefit of reading the Secretariat’s
report, they would have seen that public opinion favored a
constitutional court. Though the report reflected a diversity of
opinions, there was widespread support for powers of judicial
review to be vested in some institution and the most popular choice
was a separate constitutional court. 91 There was also support for
other institutional arrangements, including a “Supreme Court, a
Special Institution established by the Constitution, the Ministry of
Justice, or special Loya Jirgas.”92 While the consultations on which
the report was based may not have completely captured public
opinion,93 it provided the best evidence available of what the public
wanted from the new constitution.
But public engagement was essentially a sideshow that created
the appearance of participation without much substance. 94 The
greatest impediment to true public involvement was secrecy
surrounding the text of the draft. Though several draft constitutions
were in circulation among the CRC and its foreign advisors, no draft
was made public. It would have been difficult for U.S. and U.N.
officials to openly endorse a procedure that did not consult the
public, but UNAMA, the Review Commission, and Karzai feared
that opening controversial aspects to public scrutiny could weaken
their positions and possibly derail the process.95 Barnett Rubin,96 a
U.S. expert who advised the Review Commission at UNAMA’s
invitation, stated that Karzai and U.N. officials agreed to keep the
draft text confidential to avoid giving Islamists who opposed the
constitutional effort something concrete to rally against. 97 The
upshot was that the vast majority of Afghans also had no concrete
Thier, supra note 3, at 546.
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONST. REV. COMM’N, supra note 88, at 31.
92 Id.
93
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 69, at 19-20; Int’l Crisis Grp., The Constitutional
Loya Jirga, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2003).
94
MICHELE BRANDT, CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE IN POST-CONFLICT
COUNTRIES, THE UN EXPERIENCE: CAMBODIA, EAST TIMOR & AFGHANISTAN 20 (2005);
see also Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 206-09.
95
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 69, at 19-20.
96
During the Bonn negotiations, Rubin was a special advisor to the UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, and he continued
to serve as an advisor to the UN during the drafting of the constitution, the
Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
97
Rubin, supra note 61, at 9.
90
91
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information about the system of government under consideration.
This contributed to a sense that public opinion was not taken
seriously and that the process was too rushed.98
At best, the public consultation campaign informed Afghans
about the existence of the constitution, even if their opinions were
not taken into account. Alexander Thier, a legal adviser to the CRC
and the Judicial Reform Commissions in Kabul from 2002 to 2004,
noted:
In the end, the public education and consultation process did
more to advertise the process to the Afghan people and give
the illusion of inclusion than to actually provide effective
avenues for public input to the process. Most Afghans knew
that a constitutional process was under way, but few knew
what the substantive issues at stake were.99
Even this modest assessment may in fact be somewhat
optimistic. A survey by Tufts University for USAID in 2003 found
that 0% of rural women in Kabul, Herat, and Badghis provinces
were even aware of the constitutional process. Awareness was
higher among women in Kandahar (8%) and Nangarhar (26%).
Awareness among rural men ranged from 0 to 67%.100 A survey by
The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium found
higher levels of awareness among a mixed rural and urban
population, concluding that about 70% of surveyed individuals
were aware of the process. 101 Even using the most generous
numbers, about a third of Afghans had not even heard of the new
constitution. Despite the disappointing reach of public
consultations, President Bush touted these “town hall meetings” as
step towards freedom, democracy, and self-governance.102
After the consultation period, the CRC broke into groups and
debated each section of the draft constitution. 103 This phase took
longer than the meager one month allotted under the schedule
98
AFGHAN INDEP. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM 11 (2003).
99
Thier, supra note 3, at 546.
100
FEINSTEIN INT’L FAMINE CTR., TUFTS UNIV., HUMAN SECURITY AND
LIVELIHOODS OF RURAL AFGHANS, 2002-2003, at 93-94 (2004).
101
HUM. RTS. RSCH. & ADVOC. CONSORTIUM, SPEAKING OUT: AFGHAN OPINIONS
ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2003).
102
President George Bush, Remarks by the President in Commencement
Address at the University of South Carolina (May 9, 2003).
103
Thier, supra note 3, at 544.
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promulgated by the Secretariat because of debate over the court and
whether to create a presidential or a parliamentary system.104 Both
controversies related to the central question of how much power to
concentrate in the hands of the executive. On one hand, a strong
presidential system with few checks on executive power would
allow the country to unify behind a single leader and prevent
deadlock from immobilizing the government. On the other, a
parliamentary system would distribute power more widely among
different ethnic, regional, and political groups, potentially
generating more support for the new government.
In late September, the Review Commission sent a draft to Karzai
that created a system with both a president and a weak prime
minister, and an independent constitutional court. 105 The Review
Commission refined the position on the court taken by the Drafting
Commission, eliminating some responsibilities to focus on core roles
of constitutional interpretation and review. 106 Though the Review
Commission may not have had the Secretariat’s final report on
public opinion, its recommendation aligned with feedback received
during the public consultations. The Review Commission’s
recommendation was also consistent with advice from foreign
experts,107 though there were concerns about whether such a court
could effectively carry out its functions. Rubin and Yash Ghai, 108
another advisor to the CRC, made a round of suggestions in August
2003 regarding the constitutional court, including narrowing its
jurisdiction to purely constitutional matters and recommending that
judges have training in constitutional law. 109 Rubin also
commissioned a series of papers from a group of U.S.-based legal
academics that presented different options for court structure,
appointment procedures, size, jurisdictional scope, and other
technical factors. 110 Some of the papers explicitly recommended
Id.
Id. at 545.
106
Pasarlay, supra note 84, at 256.
107
Herman Schwartz, A Constitutional Court for Afghanistan, in CTR. ON INT’L
COOP., N.Y.U., AFGHANISTAN: TOWARDS A NEW CONSTITUTION 119, 119-24 (2003);
Yash Ghai & Barnet Rubin, Short Summary of Suggestions for the Constitution
(Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished comments) (on file with author).
108
Ghai is a Kenyan constitutional lawyer who is a professor of public law at
the University of Hong Kong. In addition to advising the commission on the
Afghan constitution, Ghai served as the Chairman of the Constitution of Kenya
Review Commission in the early 2000s.
109
Ghai & Rubin, supra note 107.
110
AFGHANISTAN: TOWARDS A NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 107, at 119-32.
104
105
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creating a constitutional court, 111 while others described the
different technical options or theoretical benefits and risks without
taking a particular position. The extent of the influence of these
papers and recommendations was probably minimal. Rubin made
several suggestions related to the judiciary, “none of which,” he
said, “was adopted.” Furthermore, he stated: “The U.S. role in this
process is grossly overstated by many people who were not
involved.” 112 Outside expert advice was not pushed on the two
drafting committees. Direct foreign input at this stage was minimal,
but it is noteworthy that foreign advisors, Afghan experts, and the
public all supported a constitutional court.
Karzai and his allies, however, overruled the recommendations
of the Review Commission. When the Review Commission
submitted its draft to Karzai, it was expected that it would become
public. 113 However, Karzai declined to release a draft until
undertaking extensive revisions with members of his national
security council and a few members of the Review Commission.114
When the draft was eventually released to the public, after a
ceremonial presentation to Karzai, the former king, and Brahimi,115
it differed significantly from the draft produced by the CRC. In what
the International Crisis Group described as a “radical shift,”116 the
new draft eliminated the office of the prime minister and deleted
any mention of a separate constitutional court. Instead, a new
provision was inserted into the section outlining the role of the
judiciary, granting power of constitutional interpretation to the
existing Supreme Court:

111 See Said Amir Arjomand & Kim Lane Schleppele, Constitutional Court for
Afghanistan, in CTR. ON INT’L COOP., N.Y.U., AFGHANISTAN: TOWARDS A NEW
CONSTITUTION 125, 125-31 (2003).
112
Email from Barnet Rubin, Senior Fellow and Assoc. Dir., Afg. Pak. Reg’l
Program, Ctr. on Int’l Coop., to author (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
113
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONST. COMM’N OF AFG., supra note 77, at 5; Thier, supra
note 3, at 545; see also Amin Tarzi, Why the Delay in Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya
Jirga?,
RADIO
FREE
EUR.
RADIO
LIBERTY
(Sept.
18,
2003),
https://www.rferl.org/a/1340635.html [https://perma.cc/RSP7-BVSC].
114
Int’l Crisis Grp., The Constitutional Loya Jirga, supra note 93, at 3; Thier, supra
note 3, at 545; Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 230.
115
Burt Herman, Afghanistan Unveils Draft Constitution, OCALA STARBANNER
(Nov.
4,
2003,
11:54
PM),
https://www.ocala.com/story/news/2003/11/04/afghans-revealdraft/31284914007/ [https://perma.cc/RSP7-BVSC].
116
Int’l Crisis Grp., The Constitutional Loya Jirga, supra note 93, at 3.
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The Supreme Court on only [sic] by request of the
Government and or the Courts can review the laws,
legislative decrees, international treaties, and international
conventions, for their compliance with the Constitution.
The Supreme Court shall have the authority of the
interpretation of the Constitution, laws, and legislative
decrees.117
Though the text included a mandate for the Supreme Court to
interpret the constitution, the contours of the powers were vague.
There was little discussion of how questions of interpretation would
be referred to the Court, and no indication of whether such a referral
could take place before or after a law or treaty has been
promulgated. There was also no provision delineating whether
Supreme Court interpretations are binding or advisory. These
changes concentrated power in a small number of institutions,
making it easier for Karzai, the presumptive first president, to
influence constitutional interpretation. Taken together with other
extensive changes to the structure of the government, this draft
created a much stronger executive.
Karzai’s stated reason for the changes was to avoid giving
supremacy to religious law. He was concerned that a constitutional
court would function like the Council of Guardians in Iran,
evaluating legislation for compliance with Islamic law. 118 This
explanation made little sense. It was far more likely that vesting
powers of judicial review in the existing Supreme Court would
empower religious factions because the Court was conservative and
staffed by clerics. 119 Fazal Hadi Shinwari, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court from 2002 to 2006, was a religious jurist with ties to
Islamist politicians. 120 Shinwari was initially appointed to the
117
Draft Constitution of Afghanistan (Nov. 3, 2003) (unofficial translation) (on
file with author).
118
Email from Barnet Rubin, Senior Fellow and Assoc. Dir., Afg. Pak. Reg’l
Program, Ctr. on Int’l Coop., to author, supra note 112; Interview with Zalmay
Khalilzad, supra note 14; Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 234.
119 See Barnett Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND
AFGHANISTAN 147, 157 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 2008); Int’l Crisis Grp., The
Constitutional Loya Jirga, supra note 93, at 8.
120
Alexander Thier, Balancing Religion and Rights, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 26,
2006, at 8.
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Supreme Court by former President Burhanudden Rabbani, and
Karzai elevated him to Chief Justice in 2002.121 Like Shinwari, the
other members of the court were trained in religious law, not secular
law, 122 which occupy different tracks in the Afghan legal
educational system. Under Shinwari’s leadership, the Court issued
controversial conservative rulings and elevated unqualified
judges.123
At least some members of the CRC were concerned that putting
constitutional interpretation in the hands of the Supreme Court
would benefit “reactionary elements,”124 but Karzai overruled them
in favor of consolidating executive power. In conjunction with the
shift from a semi-presidential to a fully presidential system,
eliminating the court appeared to be part of a larger design to
maximize the powers of the presidency. Karzai had long supported
such a move, under the assumption that he would be the first to
occupy the position. There was also speculation that the U.S.
supported Karzai’s position because it would be easier to influence
a government with a unitary executive without strong legislative or
judicial checks on power. 125 A strong presidential system with
Karzai at the helm would make “it easier to monitor [U.S.]
investments in Afghanistan and to coordinate with the new
government.”126
Strong opposition to the changes arose at least partially because
of a perception that they could be attributed to the U.S. Ambassador
Khalilzad.127 Though he only arrived as ambassador in November
2003, Khalilzad was close to U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
121 See Hafizullah Gardish, Chief Justice Under Scrutiny, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (Feb. 21, 2005), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/chief-justice-underscrutiny [https://perma.cc/L54U-J2LX].
122 See Crisis in Supreme Court, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 17, 2005),
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/crisis-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/5YJKS6A7] (describing the Islamic education received by Supreme Court members).
123
See Int’l Crisis Grp., Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, Report
195/Asia, at 8 (Nov. 17, 2010) (discussing Shinwari’s controversial rulings, which
included a decision to ban cable television in January 2003).
124 Id. at 7-8.
125 See Int’l Crisis Grp., The Constitutional Loya Jirga, supra note 93, at 3; Thier,
supra note 3, at 545 (discussing Karzai’s change in government from a semipresidential to a presidential system and arguing this change reflected a desire to
narrow government control and wield power more effectively with the support of
the United States).
126
Murtazashvili, supra note 4, at 43.
127 See Thier, supra note 3, at 548 (highlighting the considerable influence that
Khalilzad wielded over Karzai).
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Wolfowitz and had been active in foreign relations for many
years. 128 Karzai and Khalilzad had an unusually close working
relationship. They saw each other nearly daily and often dined
together in the evenings.129 Khalilzad demurred when asked about
his role in this stage of the drafting process, stating that there was
no U.S. advisor working directly and regularly with Karzai. 130
However, in his memoir, Khalilzad said that before the
Constitutional Loya Jirga he “worked with Afghan leaders to shunt
aside one draft that envisioned an Islamist government structure
similar to Iran’s.”131 This is likely a reference to his role in revising
the CRC’s draft in concert with Karzai and members of the National
Security Council. It is likely that he was involved in the decision to
eliminate the constitutional court. The published draft formed the
basis for the discussion at the CLJ. There were no further
opportunities for input or revision, either by the members of the
CRC or the public.
d. The Constitutional Loya Jirga
In early December 2003, two months behind schedule and only
five weeks after the public release of the draft, 502 delegates
assembled at a CLJ in Kabul to debate and ratify the final text.132 This
event was a major victory for the United States and the United
Nations—a visual demonstration of their commitment to an
Afghan-led process. The Jirga provided an opportunity for delegates
to voice their concerns in a public forum, though like earlier
opportunities for public engagement, the pathways to meaningful
participation were few. As one delegate noted: “They’ve picked a
presidential system, and the draft constitution is based on that. If we
changed that now, we’d have a whole new set of problems.” 133
Many major decisions had already been made and would prove
difficult to alter, though the creation of the special commission to
128 Id.; see also KHALILZAD, supra note 11, at 71-73 (detailing his years working
as a diplomat and his close working relationship to Paul Wolfowitz).
129 See KHALILZAD, supra note 11, at 191.
130 See Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, supra note 14.
131
KHALILZAD, supra note 11, at 194.
132
Most delegates were elected to represent their home district; fifty were
appointed by Karzai. See Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 239-40; see also Int’l Crisis Grp.,
The Constitutional Loya Jirga, supra note 93.
133 Wide Angle: Hell of a Nation (PBS television broadcast Sept. 9, 2005).
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oversee the constitution—the institution that would come to rival
the Supreme Court—was a partial victory for a coalition of delegates
who strongly opposed several elements of the published draft. Most
delegates supported the creation of some type of constitutional
court.134
The Jirga was ostensibly structured to promote dialogue among
different coalitions. Delegates were divided into working groups,
each of which had a representative on a thirty-eight-member
coordination committee. The makeup of the working groups was
originally supposed to be random. In practice, however, many
participants felt that militia leaders were distributed among them
such that other voices were drowned out. 135 Most of the serious
negotiating occurred in VIP tents flanking the main tent that hosted
the public debates and served as the backdrop for foreign news
crews.136 Khalilzad and Brahimi were quite active in the VIP tents.
According to one international advisor:
These two men were determined to bring about an
agreement within a brief period of time that would support
their key Afghan allies (President Karzai), provide enough
incentives to keep opposition figures engaged in the political
process, and stand up to international scrutiny on issues of
human rights, women’s rights, and democratic
governance.137
Khalilzad maintained that he played a smaller role at the Jirga
than others seem to believe. 138 In any event, the presence of
foreigners and media—not to mention the fact that the U.N. was
funding the meeting—exerted pressure on the discussions to fit a

See Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 249.
See Thier, supra note 3, at 548 (discussing the agreement to distribute the
mujahideen leadership and their supporters among the various constitutional
committees); see also Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 243 (“[L]eaders of the former
mujahideen parties headed almost every working group of the CLJ.”); Loya Jirga:
Roundup of Proceedings, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 26, 2004),
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/loya-jirga-roundup-proceedings
[https://perma.cc/2932-7RES] (highlighting participants’ fear of former militia
commanders and reluctance to disagree with them in light of their influence and
power).
136 See Thier, supra note 3, at 550; see also Ghani, supra note 3 (discussing the
physical layout of the CLJ and access for journalists).
137
Thier, supra note 3, at 550.
138
Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, supra note 14.
134

135
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neat narrative of progress towards a constitution that papered
over competing interests and ongoing conflicts.
The time pressure came into play during the final days of the
Jirga, when negotiations almost broke down entirely. There was
significant disagreement over several issues, including the
establishment of a national language, the status of government
ministers with dual citizenship, and the extent of presidential
power. As a compromise measure, on December 29, delegates
agreed to keep the presidential system but introduced a high council
that would evaluate new legislation for compliance with the
constitution—essentially taking on some of the functions of a
constitutional court.139 But the draft presented the next day did not
include the high council, causing an outcry. 140 Two powerful
figures, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf,
supported the council. Support from these two conservative former
militia leaders meant that the issue could not be ignored, though
their endorsement also caused female, pro-democracy delegates
who had previously supported a constitutional court to abandon it.
A female delegate from Kabul, Suria Parlika, said: “At first we
women agreed with this proposal. But later we realized there were
jihadis working for their own advantage and wanting to dominate
the country. So we changed our stance.” 141 Others opposed the
council from the beginning because it appeared to grant a significant
amount of power to “jihadi leaders.”142 Around this time, another
article of the Constitution was amended to read: “No law shall
contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in
Afghanistan.”143 Earlier drafts had insisted on compliance with both
Islam and the values of the constitution, which included
139 See Golnaz Esfandiari, Afghanistan: Loya Jirga Adjourns amid Disputes over
Constitution,
RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY
(Dec.
29,
2003),
https://www.rferl.org/a/1105430.html
[https://perma.cc/VMA6-JS8R]
(discussing the delegates’ agreement to establish a high council that would
counterbalance presidential power by reviewing laws for constitutional
compliance).
140
Ezatullah Zawab, Mohammad M. Mehraban & Danish Karokhel, Articles
Altered in Constitution, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 1, 2004),
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/articles-altered-constitution
[https://perma.cc/Y6N8-KJU7] (describing a heated exchange among delegates
after the article creating the council was not included in the revised constitutional
draft); see also Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 250.
141
Zawab et al., supra note 140.
142 Id.
143
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan 26, 2004,
art. 3.
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international human rights law. The combination of this change
with the creation of some type of constitutional review commission
created the potential for the commission to function like a religious
review board, prompting the liberals to withdraw their support.
Shifting bases of support for a constitutional review board or
court illustrate the dialectic relationship between religion, power,
and institutional design. Karzai said he opposed the creation of a
constitutional court because of its potential to become a religious
court, even as he empowered a Supreme Court known to be
religiously conservative. At the CLJ, the debate over the court often
played out in religious terms, but religion and ideology alone do not
explain positions on the court and executive power. 144 At various
times, Afghans with vastly different ideologies supported a
constitutional court. Support or opposition was more tied to
preferences for or against strong institutions that could challenge a
powerful executive.
With the Jirga deadlocked, Sayyaf presided over a meeting on
Wednesday, December 31 to try to reach an agreement. This effort
was unsuccessful, and the meeting broke up amidst shouts and
insults. 145 The coordinating committee then reached an apparent
compromise, making changes to five articles of the draft, including
adding Article 157 and creating the Independent Commission for
Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution:
The Independent Commission for supervision of the
implementation of the Constitution shall be established in
accordance with the provisions of the law. Members of this
Commission shall be appointed by the President with the
endorsement of the House of People.146
The new text created a commission similar to the deleted high
council, but it eliminated the explicit grant of authority to interpret
the constitution. These changes were discussed with various power
144
As a general matter, there is no clear-cut ideological or religious
perspective on a constitutional court. Liberals might support a strong institution in
the style of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, while Islamists can point to
the Council of Guardians in Iran. Proponents of women’s or minority rights could
see a separate court as an asset or a threat, depending on its mandate and
composition.
145 See Loya Jirga Falls into Disarray, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 1,
2004),https://iwpr.net/global-voices/loya-jirga-falls-disarray
[https://perma.cc/YX3Y-FUE2].
146
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004,
art. 157.
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brokers at the Jirga and then read aloud to the entire assembly on
Thursday and “declared approved.”147 No debate or objection was
permitted. The leadership decided not to put the final text up for a
vote; instead, delegates were merely asked to stand to show their
approval.148 The provisions on judicial review, as well as the final
constitution, were passed without so much as a discussion.
The ambiguity of the new text was immediately apparent to
journalists and observers. The Washington Post noted that “[s]everal
contentious issues were left unresolved in order salvage the
assembly.”149 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting further said:
The article fails to specify how the commission would be
composed or the extent of its powers. It is also unclear
whether the commission will rule on the constitutionality of
new laws—a role otherwise assigned to the Supreme
Court—or have the authority for other practical aspects of
the new government.150
The role of the Supreme Court was called into question because
the CLJ amended Article 121 as well, eliminating the section which
had granted the court explicit authority to interpret the constitution.
The new text read:
Article 121

Ch. 7

At the request of the Government, or courts, the Supreme
Court shall review the laws, legislative decrees, international
treaties as well as international covenants for their
compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation in
accordance with the law.151
The text gives little indication of whether Supreme Court rulings
are binding or advisory or whether the Court can strike down laws.
Zawab et al., supra note 140.
Thomas Ruttig, Flash from the Past: Long Live Consensus – A Look Back at the
2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/flash-to-the-past-long-live-consensus-alook-back-at-the-2003-constitutional-loya-jirga/ [https://perma.cc/6MSH-A6GU].
149
Pamela Constable, Afghan Delegates Approve Charter, WASH. POST (Jan. 5,
2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/05/afghandelegates-approve-charter/5ea4e0dd-1beb-4e2d-8272-957df06a2961/
[https://perma.cc/UT9N-RE4K].
150
Zawab et al., supra note 140.
151
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004,
art. 121.
147

148
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Nor does it clarify who precisely can request review. 152 Most
problematically, Article 121 does not explicitly grant the Supreme
Court authority to interpret the Constitution itself, only “laws,
legislative decrees, international treaties as well as international
covenants.”153
Nevertheless, some analysts maintain that there was never any
dispute over the interpretive authority of the Supreme Court.
Mohammad Qasim Hashimzai, former Deputy Minister of Justice
and Chair of the ICOIC, stated before he was appointed to the
Commission that “[n]either the drafters of the constitution nor the
members of the Lōya Jirga intended to provide [the ICOIC] with the
mandate of constitutional interpretation or adjudication.” 154 At a
workshop in 2008, several legal scholars who participated in the
drafting agreed that Article 121 granted powers of interpretation to
the Supreme Court.155 Khalilzad agreed that his understanding at
the end of the Jirga was that the Supreme Court had the authority to
interpret the constitution, but added that the inclusion of Article 157
allowed debate on the issue to be delayed since delegates could not
come to consensus. 156 Other members of the Constitutional Loya
Jirga, including Sayyaf, disagreed.157

152
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, AFGHANISTAN’S
CONSTITUTION 2004: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON INTERPRETATION 3 (2008); Timory,
supra note 78, at 238; cf. GHIZAAL HARESS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN: A
FLAWED PRACTICE 23 (2017) (explaining that the Court accepted a case referred by
the President but rejected one referred by an individual minister and arguing that
neither case should have been accepted because individuals cannot make referrals).
153
In the official Dari text, the grammatical structure is similar to the
translation above—the pronoun “aanha” meaning “their” follows the list of items
over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Due to its placement in the
sentence, the Constitution is not explicitly encompassed within the list of items to
be interpreted. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Relationship Between Executive
and Parliament and the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication During
the Karzai Years 17 (Hamida Barmaki Organization for the Rule of Law, Working
Paper No. 2015/01, 2015).
154
Hashimzai, supra note 79, at 678.
155
Kamali, supra note 153, at 17. In addition to Hashimzai, this group included
Sarwar Danesh, member of the Constitutional Drafting Commission, participant in
the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and former Vice President.
156
Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, supra note 14.
157
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 253 n.318.
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Khalilzad referred to the final text as a “compromise.”158 Rubin
called it a “last-minute power grab.”159 In either case, the process by
which the article was added suggests that the new commission
would have some real power, however ill-defined. An institution
tasked only with monitoring the technical implementation of the
Constitution could hardly be described as a meaningful concession
to Sayyaf and Rabbani, who sought greater checks on presidential
power. Accordingly, the Associated Press described it as “another
potential power base for a rival [to Karzai].” 160 Furthermore, the
deletion of the portion of Article 121 granting the Supreme Court
explicit authority to interpret the Constitution suggests that the
ICOIC would take on this role. However, the text of both Article 157
and Article 121 was sufficiently vague as to support a multitude of
understandings.161
The indeterminacy was allowed to remain because it did not
cross any substantive U.S. redlines, such as those regarding formal
gender equality, and it preserved the broad contours of
centralization and executive power favored by the United States. But
it did not reflect a considered compromise reached among Afghan
factions. The speed of the vote and lack of debate favored the foreign
goal of a quick resolution.
III. POLITICAL POWER STRUGGLES
Though the Constitutional Loya Jirga marked the close of the
two-year drafting period, it was only the beginning of the struggle
for authority to interpret the Constitution and review government
action for compliance. The dispute played out in the National
Assembly, the Office of the President, and the press. The heart of the
conflict remained a fundamental disagreement about institutional
158
Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, supra note 14; Pasarlay, supra note 63, at
253 n.318.
159
Email from Barnet Rubin, Senior Fellow and Assoc. Dir., Afg. Pak. Regional
Program, Ctr. on Int’l Coop., supra note 112.
160
Stephen Graham, Afghans Agree on New Constitution Aimed at Underpinning
Fragile Peace, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 4, 2004.
161
Further complicating the interpretation of Article 157, after the
Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the text but before Karzai signed the document,
a number of small errors were corrected and a few substantive changes were
introduced. One of these affected Article 157. Originally, the members of the
commission were to be appointed by the president. In the final text, they must be
approved by the Wolesi Jirga. Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 259.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/4

2022

The Roots of Collapse

145

checks on executive power, but the parameters changed. With the
selection of Commissioners left to the President, and confirmation
required by the lower house of the National Assembly (the Wolesi
Jirga), 162 there was no great fear that a specialized commission
would impose a religious litmus test on legislation.163 Instead, the
commission became a battleground between the President and the
Wolesi Jirga, each seeking to use it to advantage. U.S. involvement
receded as Afghan factions dealt with the fallout of contested
institutional arrangements.
a. Enabling Legislation and the Spanta Affair
The Commission did not come into existence immediately after
the adoption of the Constitution. From 2004 to 2008, the Supreme
Court issued several opinions that “appeared for a time to establish
it as the preeminent arbiter of the law.” 164 Article 157 was still
occasionally invoked as a potential threat to the legitimacy of the
constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court.165 But it was not
until 2007 that a major rift between Karzai and the Wolesi Jirga
brought the ambiguity into the forefront. The Wolesi Jirga held a
vote of no-confidence in two government ministers, including
Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, for failing to prevent
Afghan refugees from being expelled from Iran. When counting the
ballots, two were found to be blank. This irregularity affected the
outcome of the vote. The Wolesi Jirga then held another vote, which
went against Spanta. Karzai, who had been elected President in
2004, objected to the second vote and referred the situation to the
162
The Afghan parliament consists of two chambers: the Wolesi Jirga, or
House of the People, and the Meshrano Jirga, or House of the Elders. Members of
the Wolesi Jirga are elected by popular vote. Members of the Meshrano Jirga are
elected or appointed by the president, regional councils, and district councils. THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004, arts. 82-84.
163
Compliance with Islamic law has not been a major issue for either the
Supreme Court or the ICOIC, though the Supreme Court issued one interpretation
finding that Afghanistan could withdraw from any international treaty that
violated Islamic Law. See Timory, supra note 78, at 262.
164
Int’l Crisis Grp., Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition,
Report 236/Asia, at 13 (Oct. 8, 2012); see also KAMALI, supra note 13, at 11 n.38
(referencing three instances before 2007 where the Supreme Court interpreted the
Constitution).
165
Telephone interview with John Dempsey, Senior Advisor, U.S. Dept. of
State (May 9, 2015).
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Supreme Court. The Court held that Spanta could not have been
expected to prevent Iran from expelling the refugees and the vote of
no confidence was therefore invalid. Former President Burhannudin
Rabbani, who was assassinated in 2011, suggested that Karzai
pressured the Supreme Court into reaching that decision. 166
Regardless, the Court was perceived to be allied with the
President. 167 The Wolesi Jirga disregarded the Supreme Court
ruling, arguing that it did not have jurisdiction to invalidate the
vote,168 and passed enabling legislation creating the ICOIC. Karzai
vetoed the legislation, arguing that it violated the Constitution and
that the Supreme Court already had powers of judicial review. The
Wolesi Jirga then passed the legislation again with the two-thirds
margin of support necessary to override a presidential veto. The
legislation unequivocally gave the ICOIC authority to interpret the
Constitution, though it did not clarify if the ICOIC’s opinions would
be advisory or binding: “For effective implementation of the
provisions of the constitution, the Commission shall have the
following authorities and responsibilities (including): Interpretation
of the constitution on the request of President, National Assembly,
Supreme Court and the Executive.”169
Karzai referred the law to the Supreme Court, which predictably
ruled that the Court itself had authority to interpret the
Constitution. In an in-depth analysis, 170 the Court reviewed the
constitutional drafting history in an effort “to put an end to the
questions and prove itself as the final authority on Constitutional
interpretation.”171 The Court modified the legislation without input
from the Wolesi Jirga, deleting the sections that gave the ICOIC
unambiguous authority to interpret the Constitution, as well as
other sections related to the Commissioners’ ability to remove a

Kamali, supra note 13, at 11.
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 123, at 2; See also Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 27475 (“The Supreme Court was indeed under the thumbs of the executive, and Karzai
used it to resolve constitutional disputes in a way that favored his own interests.”).
168
Kamali, supra note 13, at 10-11.
169 Id. at 12.
170
Timory, supra note 78, at 254 (summarizing the Court’s reasoning).
171 Id. at 258.
166
167
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fellow Commissioner. 172 The modified version was published as
law.173
The published version was far less explicit about the
responsibilities of the Commission. It emphasized its oversight role,
rather than any interpretive functions. The omitted sections reflect
the articles which were removed by the Supreme Court:174
The Commission, in order to better oversee the
implementation of the provisions of the Constitution shall
have the Following duties and authorities:
1. . . .
2. Overseeing observance and implementation of the
provisions of the Constitution by the president,
Government,
National
Assembly,
Judiciary,
administrative
units, governmental
and nongovernmental organizations.
3. Providing legal advice to the President and Parliament
regarding issues arising from the Constitution.
4. . . .
5. Providing specific recommendations to the President
and National Assembly, in order to take necessary
measures for development of legislative affairs, in the
areas stipulated by the Constitution.
6. Presenting report to the President, in case of observing
violations and infringements of provisions of the
Constitution.
7. Approval of relevant rules and procedures.175
The revised legislation did not reflect the intention of the Wolesi
172
ALI YAWAR ADILI, ROHULLAH SORUSH & SAYED ASADULLAH SADAT, THE
STAGNATION OF AFGHANISTAN’S STATE INSTITUTIONS: CASE STUDIES OF THE SUPREME
COURT, SENATE, PROVINCIAL COUNCILS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT
COMMISSION 2 (2021); Timory, supra note 78, at 256.
173
MPs Approve Members of Constitution Commission Amidst LegislativeExecutive Standoff on Interpretation Powers, LEGIS. NEWSL. (USAID Afg. Parliamentary
Assistance Project), June 14, 2010, at 2.
174
Timory, supra note 78, at 249.
175
Law on Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of
the Constitution, 2009 art. 8 (Afg.).
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Jirga, nor did it resolve the conflict over institutional authority,
continuing the uncertainty over which institution had ultimate
authority.
b. Undermining the ICOIC
From its inception, the ICOIC was a challenge by the Wolesi Jirga
to the association between Karzai and the Supreme Court. Karzai
dominated the Court through his appointment powers and
relationships with several of the justices, 176 and he (and future
President Ashraf Ghani) sought to influence or hobble the ICOIC.
The first tactic was simply to delay the formation of the Commission.
According to its enabling legislation, members of the Commission
were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Wolesi
Jirga.177 The executive stalled, however, only putting forth nominees
in June 2010 in response to an ultimatum from the Wolesi Jirga.178
For the previous two years, the Wolesi Jirga had sent draft
legislation to the non-existent commission in a farce to highlight
executive delay. Upon receiving nominees, the Wolesi Jirga ensured
that potential commission members shared the view that their role
was to interpret the Constitution. During confirmation hearings,
Speaker Yunus Qanooni posed the question bluntly, asking the
nominees: “Does the authority to interpret the Constitution lie with
the Supreme Court or the Commission?” After some evasion, all five
nominees agreed that the Commission had the right to interpret the
Constitution as stated in the ICOIC law as drafted by the Wolesi
Jirga.179 As MP Abdul Kabir Ranjibar noted in an interview with the
International Crisis Group:

176
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 275-77; Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 123, at 15; see
also Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 164, at 14 (noting that Karzai declined to remove
several Supreme Court justices from office once their terms expired).
177
Law on Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of
the Constitution, art. 4 §1 (Afg.).
178
Martine van Bijiert, Continuing Tug of War Between the Parliament and Karzai,
AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (June 20, 2010), https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/continuing-tug-of-war-between-theparliament-and-karzai/ [https://perma.cc/B27G-58XY].
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Commission nominees were confirmed after heated debate
in parliament and were placed under considerable pressure
by several MP’s to publicly promise to implement their
constitutional review power. This marked a clear effort by
opposition parliament members to check the president’s
power and further politicised the commission’s
establishment.180
These nominees were approved, bringing the ICOIC into being,
though Karzai had only nominated five commissioners—the
minimum number of members to establish a quorum.181
Karzai and Ghani continued to hamper the operation of the
ICOIC by appointing only a partial slate of commissioners. This
made it more difficult for the Commission to function, especially as
many of the lawyers, judges, and professors who were qualified to
serve had other opportunities that regularly took them abroad. The
ICOIC should have seven members; however, it was only fully
staffed for two years during the period between 2010 and 2021.182
For most of its existence, the ICOIC had between two and six
members, and their roles were often contested. Presidents allowed
their terms to expire without re-appointment, asked nominees who
were rejected by the Wolesi Jirga to serve as acting members (which
was not constitutional), and refused to appoint new members to
replace those who died, were appointed to other government
positions, or simply stopped performing their duties.183
In 2017, President Ghani initiated a more direct effort to curtail
the independence of the Commission. In April 2017, six of the
Commissioners had voted to expel their chairman, Mohammad
Qasem Hashimzai, due to corruption and impairment from old
age. 184 The Commissioners acted in accordance with the ICOIC
enabling legislation as it was passed by the Wolesi Jirga, but those
provisions had been altered by the Supreme Court. No subsequent
Int’l Crisis Grp., supra note 123, at 16 n.130.
Law on Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of
the Constitution, art. 10 §1 (Afg.).
182
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183 Id.
184
Ali Yawar Adili & Ehsan Qaane, The Constitutional Oversight Commission in
a Standoff with President Ghani: Defending Their Independence or Covering up Mistakes?,
AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-constitutional-oversightcommission-in-a-standoff-with-president-ghani-defending-their-independenceor-covering-up-mistakes/ [https://perma.cc/N6VG-24WL].
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legislation had clarified when commissioners could remove one of
their own. 185 The President rejected the Commissioners’ decision
and established a committee to investigate not only the effort to
remove Hashimzai, but all the work of the Commission. The six
Commissioners rejected this request, seeing it as a threat to their
independence. Though the Commissioners may have, in fact,
overstepped their constitutional and legislative authority in trying
to oust Hashimzai, the subsequent presidential intervention was
perceived to be a continuation of the dispute over the authority of
the ICOIC. The Commission had taken several steps that aroused
presidential ire, including issuing an opinion arguing that some
aspects of a peace agreement between the government and Hezb-eIslami, a political and military group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
were unconstitutional. 186 The ICOIC had also recently drafted a
report detailing several constitutional violations, including those by
the President. 187 With presidential support and some ambiguity
around who could legally remove commissioners, Hashimzai
remained in his post.
c. Institutional Alliances
From its inception at the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the ICOIC
was considered a vehicle to challenge presidential power. The
Commission was commonly assumed to be sympathetic to the
Wolesi Jirga, while the Supreme Court was more favorable to the
President. However, the ICOIC did not immediately become a
strong voice against presidential interests. 188 Its findings and
investigations pointed to many government institutions and actors
who had allegedly violated the Constitution. 189 However, the
competition between the Supreme Court and ICOIC allowed the
President and Wolesi Jirga to take advantage of the situation by

185
186
187
188
189

Timory, supra note 78, at 251, 256.
Adili & Qaane, supra note 184.
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seeking multiple opinions. 190 Different actors sought to pit the
institutions against each other,191 leading to unpredictability.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN PRACTICE
The conflict over the responsibilities of the Supreme Court and
the ICOIC was never resolved, but in practice both institutions
carried out some elements of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation. This could have resulted in a durable—even more
democratic—resolution of the dispute as the institutions over time
developed a political culture of shared responsibility. In fact,
however, the continuing uncertainty stifled potential alternative
power bases to the presidency and further weakened trust in the
central government.
While upholding or striking down legislation is the core of
judicial review, other activities can include a priori review of
legislation, a priori or ex post review of international treaties, review
of executive action, resolution of disputes between governmental
actors, and issuing advisory opinions. Ghizaal Haress, a former
ICOIC Commissioner, notes that many constitutional courts are
tasked with an even broader list of responsibilities, including
“resolving electoral disputes, certifying electoral results, conducting
impeachments for senior public officials or validating such
impeachments and adjudicating issues related to political
parties.” 192 These activities may be carried out at the request of
individual citizens, lower courts, government agencies, the
legislature, or at the initiative of the reviewing body itself. Even as
the Supreme Court and the ICOIC sparred over who had the
authority to review legislation, they engaged in a range of other
activities that could have encouraged constitutional compliance.
Article 121 provided two clear pathways for the Supreme Court
to “review the laws, legislative decrees, international treaties as well
as international covenants for their compliance with the
Constitution.”193 They could be referred either by the Government
190
SCOTT WORDEN & SYLVANA Q. SINHA, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION AND THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2011).
191
Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 283-86.
192
HARESS, supra note 152, at 11.
193
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004,
art. 121.
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or the courts. In practice, however, lower courts did not refer
legislation for review, though they asked for clarification on abstract
issues of constitutional interpretation. 194 Haress found that lower
court judges did not consider themselves empowered to refer
specific legislation for review and that some considered Article 121
to grant the Supreme Court powers of constitutional interpretation
only, not authority to strike down laws.195 This cut off one of the
main avenues that ordinary litigants would have had to seek judicial
review of legislation. The Supreme Court, however, reviewed
legislation at the request of the President and other executive offices.
In addition to the ICOIC legislation, it evaluated laws on
parliamentary influence over state media and whether certain
diplomatic employees could be dual citizens. 196 This pathway to
review reinforced the perception that the Supreme Court was
aligned with the President and executive branch. The President only
referred the ICOIC and media laws after his veto was overcome by
a two-thirds vote of support for the laws in the Wolesi Jirga. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred the law prohibiting certain
diplomatic and consular employees from holding dual citizenship.
In each case, the Supreme Court resolved the question in a manner
favorable to the executive, contributing to the impression that
“judicial review had become a tool for advancing executive
interests.” 197 It essentially became a court of last resort for the
executive branch.
While the Supreme Court conducted ex post review of
legislation at the request of the President and other executive
officials, the ICOIC took on a range of complementary
responsibilities. From 2012-2013, the Commission largely responded
to requests for guidance from government departments. It
addressed the legality of the detention of prisoners under the
Memorandum of Understanding between Afghanistan and the U.S.,
the status of contracts voided by the Wolesi Jirga, and jurisdictional
conflicts over the role of government offices.198 By 2015, the ICOIC
was reviewing statutes for constitutional compliance before
promulgation and advising the President and the National
194
HARESS, supra note 152, at 19-20 (finding that not a single lower court had
referred a statute to the Supreme Court from 2004 to 2016).
195 Id. at 20-21.
196 Id. at 24-27.
197 Id. at 27-28.
198
Kamali, supra note 153, at 23.
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Assembly on issues of constitutional implementation. 199 Between
2010 and 2017, the ICOIC issued 80 opinions. At least 29 of these
were initiated by the ICOIC itself; 31 were in response to requests
from institutions listed in the Commission’s enabling legislation;
and 14 were in response to other institutions. 200 Legal scholar
Shamshad Pasarlay argued that “[w]ith these three kinds of
functions, it appears that the Constitutional Supervision
Commission [ICOIC] almost acts as the proposed constitutional
court would have done under the earlier drafts of the
Constitution,” 201 though these responsibilities were split between
the Supreme Court and the ICOIC. The Supreme Court reviewed
laws for constitutionality after they were promulgated while the
ICOIC provided a range of other functions. The ICOIC did not,
however, have the institutional clout to limit, or even rigorously
monitor, actions of the other branches. Efforts to actively supervise
the courts or the legislative branch were rebuffed. The status of its
opinions was unclear, so the President and Parliament could easily
ignore them. In 2016, the Wolesi Jirga demonstrated how the ICOIC
could be diminished. After members of the Commission declined to
appear to explain an opinion, the ICOIC found its budget cut and its
powers reduced. 202 Both the President and Wolesi Jirga ignored
inconvenient rulings of the ICOIC. 203 The Commission’s limited
ability to serve as a reliable check on executive and legislation power
stemmed from these political maneuvers and the constitutional
ambiguity surrounding the ICOIC’s authority.
The de facto division of labor between the two institutions was
not as neat as it might appear. Though the Supreme Court seemed
to have a monopoly on rewriting existing laws to conform with the
Constitution, the overlapping responsibilities allowed executive
officials to ‘forum-shop’ and endorse the constitutional
interpretation that suited them. The indeterminate status of ICOIC
opinions allowed them to be ignored, and the association between
the Supreme Court and the executive branch imperiled the
199
Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review
in Afghanistan: Is There Still a Crisis?, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/03/constitutional-interpretation-andconstitutional-review-in-afghanistan-is-there-still-a-crisis
[https://perma.cc/R4MU-ZNPR].
200
HARESS, supra note 152, at 37.
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legitimacy of its opinions. There were practical drawbacks to this
arrangement as well. Individuals had no ability to access judicial
review, leaving gaps in protections for individual rights, 204 which
did nothing to counter the widespread public sense that the central
government was corrupt and inaccessible.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Judicial review could have played an important role—both
substantively and symbolically—in demonstrating that disputes
could be resolved through peaceful, legal means. Instead, the
dispute between the Supreme Court and the ICOIC is one example
of how the Constitution of 2004 failed to create a viable, effective
system of governance. While some jockeying for power among
institutions may have been inevitable and even desirable, the lack of
clear division of authority led to gridlock affecting the ICOIC,
Supreme Court, Wolesi Jirga, and executive branch. It eroded
confidence in the ability of the Supreme Court and independent
institutions to operate free from presidential influence. By
concentrating so much power in the executive and not providing
adequate formal opportunities to challenge that power, the United
States and its allies undermined efforts to create an effective, stable
governmental structure.
a. Unpredictability
The inability of any institution to effectively curb
unconstitutional action is not merely a theoretical problem. It
introduces a high level of uncertainty in lawmaking and
governance. While there is always some level of unpredictability
when it comes to judicial review and constitutional interpretation,
clear procedures and legislative guidance can create a predictable
process with a limited range of substantive outcomes. The
alternative can lead to delay, illegitimacy, and distrust. In
Afghanistan, the cost of uncertainty was high:
The vagueness of the constitutional text, self-serving
interpretations of the constitution by the Supreme Court and
204
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the [ICOIC], and uncompromising attitudes toward conflict
are preventing the effective operation of constitutional
mechanisms. As a result, numerous pieces of critical
legislation have been significantly delayed, and
intragovernmental conflict is high, even if it has not resulted
in internal violence.205
In addition to delays, conflict over interpretive authority left
legislation in limbo. The IOCIC legislation, for example, was
published in an edited form after the Supreme Court struck down
several portions of it, but the Wolesi Jirga never accepted the
redacted version. 206 The executive and legislative branches
fundamentally disagreed about the substance of the law, and no
institution could resolve the debate. Furthermore, the dispute
exacerbated the consolidation of power in the hands of the
executive, leading to more instability.
b. Weak Constitutionalism
Though there was a partial functional division of work between
the Supreme Court and the ICOIC, the result was a weak
institutionalization of judicial review. The ICOIC struggled to be an
effective check on unconstitutional action, and the mandate of the
Supreme Court was limited to a small number of issues important
to the executive branch. The ICOIC itself was insecure, with
inconsistent staffing and a budget subject to the whims of the Wolesi
Jirga. Without a strong constitutional mandate, and little support
from the President, the ICOIC became a shadow of the court
envisioned by many drafters. The lack of a legitimate body that
could oversee the other branches of government undermined even
a formal commitment to constitutional governance.
The other side of weak constitutional enforcement is that it
leaves political actors maximum flexibility to negotiate solutions
that reflect the facts on the ground at the time, not those of 2004. For
example, neither the Supreme Court nor the ICOIC raised an
objection to the creation of a National Unity Government in 2014,
which ushered in an extra-constitutional governing structure
205
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2014, at 116, 126.
206
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consisting of a power-sharing agreement between the president and
a newly created chief executive officer. 207 The agreement called for
a loya jirga to amend the constitution and create a prime minister,
but these reforms never materialized. 208 Another extraconstitutional power-sharing agreement in March 2020 saw two
presidents claim electoral victory; both were sworn in.209 Clearly the
structural arrangements contemplated in the Constitution could not
bind political actors. Pasarlay argues that the original breakdown
occurred because Karzai moved aggressively to interpret and
implement the Constitution in a way that strongly favored the
executive, ending the ability of the 2004 Constitution to coordinate
disparate elements of the Afghan political elite. 210 After Karzai’s
tenure ended, it was increasingly clear that the Constitution did not
create the structures necessary to resolve disputes and adequately
limit executive power. This fluidity of political arrangements could
have been an asset, but extra-constitutional solutions to political
problems do not lay a foundation of respect for the rule of law.
Vague and ambiguous constitutional provisions are common
and have not necessarily led to failure. The American Constitution,
for example, does not explicitly grant the Supreme Court powers of
judicial review.211 It was a full thirteen years after ratification that
the Court definitively claimed this authority in Marbury v Madison.212
Historically, constitutional vagueness has allowed intractable
disputes to be resolved over time, through political compromise and
maneuvering. Vagueness can even be a strategy to delay forcing a
decision on controversial issues. 213 Deferral of this type is fairly
207
See Ghizaal Haress, Did Politics Compromise Afghanistan’s Constitution?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 23, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/23/didpolitics-compromise-afghanistans-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/CE7F-VPX7]
(summarizing the power-sharing agreement and the events surrounding it).
208
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common, and strategic deferral may contribute to constitutional
longevity.214
In the Afghan case, however, deferral was not necessarily
“strategic” in the sense that the drafters agreed to postpone a
decision on judicial review; rather, the ambiguous provisions were
the product of haste and foreign pressure. The ambiguity garnered
a broader base of support for the Constitution and allowed the issue
to be addressed through subsequent political debate and
institutional competition.215 Negotiations might have broken down
entirely at the CLJ without some type of forced compromise, but the
resulting institutional design ensured ongoing conflict while
contributing to the creation of the extra-constitutional governing
arrangements and the breakdown of constitutional order. 216 The
2020 power sharing agreement called for “the Constitution [to] be
amended to restructure the government, break the hold of the
president on power, reform the electoral system, and empower local
governments.” 217 These reforms never occurred, and eventually
direct U.S. negotiations with the Taliban sidelined the Afghan
government.
CONCLUSION: THE LONG SHADOW OF U.S. INFLUENCE
From the vantage point of 2022, the international effort to create
a constitutional government in Afghanistan was an abject failure.
But the failure is not the lifespan of the Constitution itself.
Constitutional longevity is not, necessarily, a normative good on its
own, and in fact the Afghan Constitution outlasted most

government and regulation of power are clear, and they allow for the democratic
order to function.” Id. In the Afghan case, failing to establish clear institutional roles
made it more difficult to resolve substantive conflicts later on.
214
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Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 648 (2011). Dixon and Ginsburg
analyzed constitutions containing “by law” clauses delegating decisions to future
legislatures. This case differs because deferral was achieved implicitly through
constitutional ambiguity rather than explicitly through a “by law” clause.
215 See Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 261.
216 See Int’l Crisis Grp., Afghanistan: The Future of the National Unity Government,
Report N°285 Asia, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2017).
217
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constitutions adopted over the past 200 years.218 No, the failure of
the Afghan constitution came in its inability to foster a political
culture of legitimate, independent institutions. The “original sin of
this intervention was to resurrect old institutions that had their roots
in the country’s authoritarian past rather than giving Afghans the
opportunity to build something new that embodied the norms of
self-governance which characterized most parts of the country.”219
That original sin was rooted in the substance of the 2004
Constitution, including its provisions on judicial review, but also the
process of writing it.
The United States entered the Afghan constitutional drafting
process with several specific goals; achieving a particular
arrangement regarding judicial review and constitutional
interpretation was not one of them. Instead, the United States
focused on ensuring legal protection for certain individual rights,
including formal gender equality, and—most importantly—
securing a strong executive branch for ally Hamid Karzai. On the
surface, it appeared as if the United States and United Nations
stepped back from many other areas, allowing these decisions to be
made by the Afghans themselves. But a closer look at international
influence over the entire process shows that American priorities
echoed throughout the entire text with lasting consequences for
Afghan political actors.
The 2004 Constitution reflected the hybrid nature of
contemporary imposed constitutions. Foreign control over the
process and, especially, demand for an agreement at any cost
pushed the drafters towards ambiguous compromises with limited
efficacy. The United States had explicit requirements. Khalilzad
acknowledged that the United States had red lines on several
constitutional issues,220 and the resulting constitutional provisions
were imposed regardless of Afghan views. The provisions related to
judicial review, however, could not be easily categorized as foreign
or local. They were the product of a long process shaped by
foreigners and propelled forward by Afghans. President Karzai,
who the United States backed at every turn, re-wrote the
constitutional draft prepared by the drafting committees to enhance
218
See generally ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE
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219
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executive power. He eliminated the proposed constitutional court
and transferred some of its authorities to the Supreme Court, which
was friendly towards him. Even ignoring the speculation that
Ambassador Khalilzad was directly involved, it is hard to imagine
Karzai taking these steps without American support. The United
States shared Karzai’s preference for a strong presidential system
with little judicial oversight. Karzai had the backing of some Afghan
factions, so his position cannot be said to be externally created, but
the process and outcome would have undoubtedly looked quite
different without the efforts of the United States and the United
Nations.221
Foreign intervention into procedure and process had significant
substantive implications. Foreigners controlled the timeline and
structure of the process itself, 222 which led to inadequate public
consultations and rushed decision-making. This was particularly
clear at the Constitutional Loya Jirga where, according to Ghai, the
United States and United Nations “used their positions to push for
members to reach agreement on a draft.” 223 The Afghan case
illustrates how foreign procedural interventions cannot be
separated from substantive ones.
Without foreign pressure, negotiations might have broken down
entirely over the constitutional court and other issues that
threatened to derail the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Instead, the
decision “not to decide” on judicial review meant that the issue
played out in the political arena rather than in the VIP tents. The
resulting conflict was messy, partisan, and public, 224 though
221
Cf. Pasarlay, supra note 63, at 220 (arguing that “the international
community’s influence on the Afghan constitution-making process was not as
strong as some academic literature has claimed, literature that has painted the 2004
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222
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arguably more democratic than any solution that could have been
reached at the Jirga. But in the intervening decade, the confusion
over the responsibilities of the Supreme Court and the ICOIC looked
like incompetence on the part of Afghan institutions as well as the
constitutional drafters. It appeared to be the outcome of bad advice,
poor planning, or neglect. Instead, as this Article has shown, the
constitutional ambiguity was the product of last-minute bargaining
forced by executive and foreign interference. Public opinions and
expert advice, both foreign and Afghan, were disregarded in favor
of making a deal, however imperfect.
The legacy of that deal, and of the past fifteen years of
constitutional governance in Afghanistan, is bleak. Even in the
heady days of 2004, one delegate to the CLJ from Kandahar
described the final text as “poison.”225 But despite drawing from a
poisoned well, the Wolesi Jirga was able to empower an institution
other than the Supreme Court with some powers of constitutional
interpretation—a feat that had eluded supporters of a constitutional
court at several phases of the drafting. Nevertheless, the
Constitution of 2004 and the resulting government institutions
failed to gain a level of popular legitimacy that might have
undermined future support for a return of the Taliban.
It is impossible to know whether a court with a clearer mandate
for constitutional review would have yielded a more stable
government, or whether conflicts between the President and the
Wolesi Jirga would have simply played out along other lines. The
failure of the Afghan government does not lie entirely, or even
primarily, with the Constitution. 226 Corruption, persistent foreign
meddling, an active insurgency, the lack of infrastructure, and
military failures paved the way for the collapse of the central
government and the Taliban advance. For the past several years, the
United States undermined the Afghan government in its

bodies are modified and incorporated into the constitution through an amendment
process, their institutional rivalries will probably bedevil the political system for
years to come.”).
225
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negotiations with the Taliban.227 Militarily, the U.S. decision to build
an Afghan force dependent on U.S. air support and then abruptly
stop that support in 2021 ensured a quick collapse.228 Constitutional
text, however, cannot be separated from the highly corrupt,
centralized system of formal governance that ultimately failed the
Afghan people. Nor can the text be separated from U.S. interests in
a centralized state with its ally in charge.
The rise and fall of the Afghan Constitution illustrates the futility
of trying to pretend that an occupying military force can establish a
neutral process for drafting a new constitution without shaping the
substance. It highlights the impossible position of foreign occupiers
who seek to impose institutions of Western-style democracy that
rely on, at the very least, the ideal of self-governance. Germany and
Japan may have appeared as “beacons” of hope for twenty-first
century state-builders, but Afghanistan should be a beacon of
caution.
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